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SEMIOTIC AESTHETICS AND AESTHETIC EDUCATION* 
by 
Monroe C. Beardsley 
Because of the dearth of system, as well as of confidence with which I 
enter upon this discussion, it will be helpful to me, at least, to set up an initial 
framework for it. Not that the framework itself is exempt from critical exam­
ination; but where it does not go seriously wrong, it may justify itself by 
sorting and relating the various kinds of questions that will turn up. One of my 
difficulties is that I have been reading (partly re-reading) my way through the 
six extant volumes of the Journal of Aesthetic Education, and perhaps I have 
been reading too fasl. This is an excellent journal, admirably edited by Ralph 
Smith, and it provides a rich sense of the range of questions involved in 
aesthetic education, as well as many and varied answers to them. But too large a 
dose can be bewildering. Unless l adopt a simplified schema, even if it is some­
what ad hoc, I can't see how to draw out a few of the questions for special 
attention, without getting entangled in the rest. 
I 
The core, or central, or minimal artistic enterprise consists in a person's 
bringing into being an object or event with the idea of offering it, to others or to 
himself, for aesthetic apprehension. This is not, of course, the only core­
concept that has been proposed (it contrasts radically with that projected in 
the images of Shelley's skylark and the tower of ivory), but it is, I think, the 
one that best enables us to account for the important features of the artistic 
enterprise, in its most complex- manifestations. 
This core-concept analyzes at once into two complementary activities, which 
are conveniently referred to as "artistic" and "aesthetic."1 (1) There is a 
making or creating.2 How minimal this activity may be and still be regarded as 
artistic, is a question that much discussion has left open-as I leave it here. I 
would want to insist that it consist in a little more than merely picking up a 
stone or washing its dirl. off-perhaps a careful polishing would be enough. 
And one who causes something to be made, by giving directions, I am also 
willing to call a maker. (2) There is the (actual, or at least anticipated) appre­
hension of the work made, i.e., someone's perceiving it or having it (e.g., in 
reading) as an intentional object. Innumerable disputes also center on the 
distinction between aesthetic and other possible sorts of apprehension, and 
again I leave matters open. In using the term "aesthetic apprehension," I do not 
wish to suggest a special mode of perception or imagination, but only a nar­
rowing of attention to certain features of the work rather than others, plus a 
willingness to engage one's perceplual, emotional, and intellectual powers in 
grasping those features. Which sorts of features are to count in characterizing 
aesthetic apprehension I do not try to say now; I do take it for granted that 
•All future publication righ ts reserved by the author. 
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a reasonable distinction can be made. 3 
The concept of making something for aesthetic apprehension (to use this 
abbreviated formula) does not pretend to provide a definition of "work of 
art." But it does provide a sufficient condition, and hence a start on a definition, 
or at least what might be called a "definitional account," of the concept of 
work of art. We are not limited here to good or great works of art, so we may 
feel secure in claiming (what indeed may strike you as all too obvious) that 
anything made for aesthetic apprehension has as good a claim to being called 
a work of art as anything can have. Of course , expanding contemporary usage 
sanctions the labelling as art works of many things that lie beyond the core­
concept. These broader concepts o f  art can be constructed, however, on the 
basis of the core-concept. 
For example, to deal with many of those humanly-made objects in the 
world that we aesthetically apprehend, we must take account of mixed motives. 
The idol may have been mainly designed for religious purposes. If some concern· 
for later aesthetic apprehension entered into the maker's motivation, along with 
other aims, then his making fits the core-concept, as it is to be understood. But 
suppose in a particular case the maker takes no interest at all in future aesthetic 
apprehendings, but is wholly wrapped up in his religious or magical or political 
purpose. Nevertheless, the work might belong to a genre that has been estab­
lished and acknowledged as a species of artwork;and then this particular work 
can, in an extended sense, be said to be an artwork, as belonging to that genre, 
(Once a society produces sculptural works o f  art, all its sculptures can be 
placed in the same class, whatever the motive of their making .) Then there are· 
those works that are made, not for aesthetic apprehension, but to make a point 
about aesthetic apprehension or about art itself-Dada jokes, found objects, 
"ready-mades," the singer who appears on stage but never sings a note while the 
accompaniment is played. We can easily extend the concept of art to these 
objects, too, if we wish. In any case, they can only be understood in relation 
to, as dependent upon, the core artistic activity. 
As the artistic may go beyond the aesthetic in this way, so the aesthetic 
goes beyond the artistic. But again we can best understand the aesthetic 
apprehension of nature, I think, as an extension to nature of the activity in­
volved in the core-concept of the artistic enterprise. I do not follow Richard. 
Wollheim in holding that to take the "aesthetic attitude" toward nature is to 
"regard it as a work of art."4 Nor, would I try to argue that nature could not be 
appreciated in an aesthetic way before the artistic enterprise evolved,5 though 
the appearance of humanly-made objects made especially for (or partly for) 
aesthetic apprehension must greatly have facilitated the aesthetic apprehension 
-0f nature. I mean only (and this is one of Wollheim's points) that we gain our 
clearest understanding of what aesthetic apprehension is from its role in the 
artistic enterprise, so it makes sense to identify and discriminate this kind of 
apprehension by reference to works of art. 
To complicate the model, we may now introduce a third figure (or, rather, a 
third role, :since it is roles rather than persons we are considering): the critic. But 
there are really two critics (i .e., two critical roles) to be distinguished: the coach 
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and the commentator. The critic as coach (or counsellor, or consultant) addresses 
himself to the artist: what he offers is a report on what has gone well or ill in the 
making, and recommendations for improvements, either in the work already 
made or in works yet to come. This role poses interesting questions about its 
scope and limits and suitable procedures, but I pass them by at present. The 
critic as commentator (a rather lame figure of speech, I confess) addresses him­
self to the receiver of the artwork ; his function is to assist apprehension. Taking 
the work as given, he asks what can be said about it that is both true and useful 
from the point of view of one who is concerned to make his apprehension of 
it-his perception of its form and qualities, his grasp of its meanings, his: 
realization of its values-as complete as possible. Of course, critics may perform 
many other useful tasks (our model is still highly schematic), but talking help­
fully about works of art-and, we may want to add, about natural and techno­
logical objects in which someone might take, or be induced to take, an aes­
thetic interest-is the central and basic one. 
There enters now a third pair of figures, paralleling the artist-receiver pair and 
the coach-commentator pair: these are the educators. The artistic educator is 
concerned with the production of works of art-he essays to develop powers of 
art creation. His relationship to the critic-coach may be marked in different 
ways: in one sense, coaching can be considered one of the artistic educator's 
procedures, along with many others; in another sense, the educator could be 
said to be concerned with the development of lasting dispositions, i.e., talents, 
skills, capacities, drives, etc., while the coach is concerned with the improvement 
of particular works or particular types of work. The aesthetic educator on the 
other hand, is concerned with the reception of works of art-he essays to 
develop those powers that are requisite for their successful apprehension. Again, 
we must not forget that many ether functions or goals can legitimately be 
assigned to the aesthetic educator,6 but I take this one as the heart of his enter­
prise. The role of critic-commentator can be subsumed under that of aesthetic 
educator, since a substantial part of aesthetic education consists of doing 
criticism.7 If the role of the critic is more narrowly conceived, he is set in 
complementary opposition to the aesthetic educator: the more fully the aesthe­
tic educator does his job, we might say, the less there is for the critic to do, since 
the perfectly equipped and qualified receiver would have no need of special 
assistance in the apprehension of any work. 
It is one of the several unfortunate features of this model that I overlook 
important distinctions between the concepts of learning and teaching, which 
are rather subtly related, but not fully coordinate.8 I do not identify education 
with schoolin�, but include under it processes of learning even when not 
connected with teaching. 
II 
If we think of aesthetic education in the way I have suggested, a number of 
important questions arise, some of them no doubt belonging to experimental 
psychology and related disciplines,9 but others philosophical and (more spe­
cifically) aesthetic. Our choice of underlying principles and of basic methods in 
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aesthetic education will depend in part on what we know (and we still know too 
little) about psychological and physiological mechanisms involved, say, in 
perceiving musical gestalts, in reading spatial relationships within a represen­
tational painting, in assigning expressiveness to movements of a dance, in 
being troubled by the proportions of a building, in construing highly elliptical 
modern poetry, etc. But our principles and methods will also depend on 
assumptions about fundamental features of works of art and their place in the 
whole economy of culture. For example, on some assumptions, aesthetic 
apprehension might reduce to, or consist largely of, appreciation, or even just 
emotional response; but on other assumptions, it' might be largely a cognitive 
activity. It is true that unless the powers we acquire or strengthen in the course 
of aesthetic education include the grasp of some general relationships, the 
employment of principles, the capacity to order complex data, the understand­
ing of the significance and value of what is going on, we can hardly be said to be 
dealing with education at all-rather than, say, training. I think we would want 
to say the same for political education, moral education, and religious education. 
But some writers have spoken of "visual education," as a part of aesthetic 
education, in a way that suggests that they are concerned almost exclusively 
with sharpening perceptual practice, and very little with what could be called 
thought, theory, or understanding. 
My hint of an analogy between aesthetic education and other sorts of 
education may provoke doubts whether they are all made coordinate species 
by the same principium divisionis. I believe they are. The activities are different, 
of course, and the features of the world toward which they are directed are also 
different; but in each case there is a distinctive activity (or set of activities) and 
there is a distinctive feature (or set of features). But don't ask me to say right 
now what political, moral, and religious education are; I have enough problems 
of my own. 
What is needed to ground aesthetic education is a general way of looking at 
the arts. Perhaps it should be called' a theory, though any general proposition 
about all works of art, of whatever sort, that is not an analytic consequence of a 
definition is likely to be false. The sort of philosophical principle I have in mind 
would say what basic category works of art generally, or characteristically, or at 
their best, belong to-what is to be looked for in any work of art and can 
probably be found, at least in some degree. Such a principle is the semiotic 
view of art, by which I mean, the categorization of works of art as, in the 
broadest sense, signs-that is, carriers of meaning and/or reference. In the 
twentieth century, there has been a recurrent and serious effort to establish this 
semiotic view, and thus to subsume aesthetics under the general theory of signs. 
{or symbolic functioning). The work of Charles Morris and of Susanne Langer 
has had a permanent influence on the course of aesthetic inquiry, has won firm 
supporters, has provoked a good many critics, and has failed to convince most 
aestheticians. 
The central idea common to both Morris and Langer was that a work of art is 
(or can be, and if it is a good one must be) an iconic sign, in the sense of Peirce, 
i.e., a sign that refers in virtue of its similarity to something else. Nelson 
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Goodman has now given us a new semiotic theory, far more rigorous and 
systematic, careful and pr,ecise, than the iconic signification thcory.10 His book 
is so difficult, in its terse compactness, and so full of fresh ideas about the arts, 
that it must be discussed and re-discussed from various points of view, in various 
contexts. I am concerned here only with one of the main strands of argument in 
the book, to examine its cogency and to explore briefly its possible implications 
for aesthetic education. 
There is no question that Goodman's work is a substantial improvement over 
the iconic signification theory, which has always been in difficullies: for 
example, the difficulty of providing an account of relevant similarity, and the 
difficulty of explaini.ng how something can signify merely in virtue of similarity. 
The art that has always been the most troublesome for any form of semiotic 
theory is the art of instrumental music (including music in which the human 
voice is used solely as an instrument for producing musical sounds, not for 
speaking). In fact, the number of books and essays written even in the past few 
decades to show that music has, in some manner of speaking, a "meaning" or a 
"sense'' is itself testimony to the difficulty of the task, as well as to its tempt­
ingness. The latest book that has come to my hand is by Wilson Coker,1 1 who 
treats musical figures and phrases as "gestures," and finds in music not only 
reference to psychological states and physical processes but also logical con· 
stants, such as negation and material implication, and even general truths about 
life. There is much that is interesting and challenging in Coker's book, but it is 
based on a straightforward causal concept of meaning, taken over from the early 
Morris account, and such a concept cannot, I believe, capture the element of 
rule-guidance that is essential for reference. 
, III 
A symbol scheme, for Goodman, co.nsists of characters, together with rules 
for combining them into other characters; a character is a class of marks (visual 
or auditory or other); and a mark is an inscription if and only if it belongs to a 
character. A symbol system is a symbol scheme "correlated with a field of 
reference," that is, provided with semantical rules assigning certain characters 
to certain objects or events as their referents. Goodman does not quite say, tou t 
court, that every work of art is either a character in a symbol system or a class of 
such characters, but he does try to show, in careful detail, how representational 
paintings and literary works can be so regarded, and how nonrepresentational 
paintings and instrumental musical works can also be, and (I believe he would 
claim) usually are, characters or classes of characters. 
The basic semantical relationship on this view is reference-a concept 
Goodman leaves undefined . Its principal species is denoting-also left undefined, 
but no doubt to be taken in a standard sense. A predicate (called a "descrip­
tion") such as "(is) straight" is said to denote objects or events, that is, to apply 
them, or to be a label for them; and the members of its extension are said to 
"comply with" or "possess" their label (p. 144). Goodman's proposed replace­
ment for iconic signification is a kind of reference distinct from denotation, and 
in fact involving its converse subrelation. When a label L denotes an object 0, 
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and 0 also refers to L, then 0 is said to exempUfy L. This happens most famil­
iarly when we give samples; e.g., a page of one of those fascinating but un­
manageable books in the fumiture store, made up of pieces of carpeting. Such 
a page both possesses a label and refers to it, according to Goodman, and in 
this sense exemplifies il. 
In ordinary speech it would be more natural to say that what the sample 
exemplifies is a property, rather than a label-the compound property of having 
a certain color, pattern, and weave. But this is "pampering prejudice," we are 
told (p. 89n). Goodman has ontological scruples about speaking of properties 
rather than predicates or other labels (p. 54)-"No difficulty or obscurity is 
removed by such pussyfooting" (p. 87n)-but he condescends to "defer to a 
prissy prejudice" (p. 87): "the swatch (of cloth in a tailor's book of samples) 
exemplifies only those properties that it both has and refers to" (p. 53). 
It is not easy to think of musical compositions as analogues of the cloth­
samples or carpet-samples, as though the composer had something to sell besides 
the work itself. But exemplificationality becomes aesthetically important, in 
Goodman's system, as providing an analysis of the concept of expre5.5iveness. 
When the predicate exemplified by an object is a metaphorical predicate, we. 
have metaphorical exemplification. And expression is metaphorical exemplifica­
tion. This proposal is not immediately convertible, since other conditions may 
be necessary for metaphorical exemplification to be expression (see p. 95 ); but 
the subsumption holds. This is what we must mean, or would be well-advised to 
mean, in talking of what musical compositions express, if we wish our talk to be 
sensible and verifiable. If we would normally speak of music as expressing 
certain properties-e.g., triumph or triumphantness-we must cultivate self. 
discipline and try to get used to saying, instead, that what it expresses is the 
label "(is) triumphant". 
Goodman's account of metaphor deserves a great deal of discussion on its 
own, but I don't go into that here. I only wish to question a consequence of 
insisting on labels (predicates or, Goodman says, pictures or gestures or any­
thing else that can denote) as exemplificanda. It may be that his account of 
metaphor breaks down unless we are allowed to speak of properties. Here is the 
dilemma: On the one hand, Goodman insists that 
A symbol must have every property it expresses; what counts is not whether 
anyone calls the picture sad but whether the picture is sad, whether the 
label "sad" does in fact apply. "Sad" may apply to a picture even though no 
one ever happens to use the term in describing the picture; and calling a 
picture sad by no means makes it so (p. 88). 
Very well. Notice the crucial distinction between two idioms that might be mis­
taken for each other: (1) we may say (tenselessly) that a label applies to, that is, 
belongs to, denotes, is true of something; (2) we may say that the label has bem 
applied to the object, that is, someone has actually called the object so. Pre­
sumably the label "(is) triumphant" applied, say, to the beginning of the finale 
of Beethoven's C Minor Symphony1 2  from the moment of its composition, 
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whether or not anyone. thought to apply it right away. On the other hand, a 
metaphorical label, Goodman holds, is one that "belongs but did not originally 
belong" to the object (p. 89); it has to have been transferred from another· 
domain, and, indeed, despite a certain resistance, which we would commonly 
describe by saying that only people, not symphonic movements, can be "liter­
ally" triumphant. But if there was not time (after the. C Minor Symphony was 
finished, in 1807) when the label "(is) triumphant" did not belong to, apply to, 
its finale, how could there have been a transfer? Even if it was not actually 
applied by anyone until somewhat later, it always "belonged." Perhaps we 
should recast the last-quoted remark, and say that a metaphorical label is one 
that is applied at a certain time to something in a given domain, but was 
"originally" applied to things in another domain. This way of speaking harmo­
nizes with other statements that Goodman makes about metaphors, e.g., that 
"metaphorical application of a label to an object defies an explicit or tacit prior 
denial of that label to that object" (p. 69). But it is not easy to reconcile with 
Goodman's defence against a charge: 
Yet by explaining expression in terms of the metaphorical exemplification 
of labels, I have risked the charge of making what a symbol expresses depend 
upon what is said about it-of leaving what a picture, for example, expresses 
to the accident of what terms happen to be used in describing the picture, 
and hence of crediting the expression achieved not to the artist but to the 
commentator (pp. 87-88)-
followed by the remark already quoted. The dilemma can be avoided by ad­
mitting talk of properties as well as labels-for it is propertiies that belong to 
things, and it is labels that are mQtaphorically extended from one domain to 
another and it is the absence of certain properties that grounds the "denial" of 
the label. But I am not sure this is the only way out-only that there is a problem 
here that does not seem to have been completely disposed of in Goodman's 
theory. 
It is more central to my purpose, however, to raise again the sort of skeptical 
question that philosophers from Philodemus to Hanslick-not to mention a 
sizeable company of our contemporaries-have raised against various forms of 
semiotic music aesthetics. Granted that the music is triumphant; it cannot exem­
plify, or more particularly express, triumph unless it also refers-and what reason 
could there be for saying that the music refers to anything at all, much les.5 a 
mere label? (Was Beethoven interested in labels'? After all, he never actually did 
what his friend Schindler says he seriously thought of doing: giving descriptive 
titles to all his compositions.) 
Is it something about the performance of music, its being offered as a public 
presentation, that converts mere possession of a metaphorical label into exem­
plification of it? Are there implicit rules of the music-listening game that en­
join us to take possessions as exemplifications? Or should we reason this way: 
For Goodman a symbol-scheme is a symbol-system only if at least some charac­
ters are correlated with a field of reference; but the scheme, once devised, may 
161 
8
Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 4 [1973], No. 1, Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol4/iss1/3
SEMIOTIC AESTHETICS AND AESTHETIC EDUCATION 
provide fot many characters that refer to nothing. One painting represents a sun­
flower; it has a denotation. Another represents a five-leaf clover; it denotes 
nothing. It is, however, a five-leaf-clover-picture, i.e., that classificatory label 
applies to it. Similarly, a music score (according to Goodman) denotes all the 
performances of it. Two different Charles Ives scores that remain forever un­
performed thus have the same (null) denotation; yet they are different char­
acters in the musical symbol scheme (see p. 204). Now some music is set to 
words, and we might say that to set a melody to words, at least normally� is to 
correlate it with a field of reference, and when those words, or some of them, 
also metaphorically apply to the music, we have metaphorical exemplification. 
When Purcell sets the words of Nahum Tate, 
Let the triumphs of Love 
And of Beauty be shown! 
to one of his rousing dotted-quaver melodies, and the melody is itself trium­
phant, then this melody does exemplify its label. (We must set aside ironic 
combinations: when Sullivan sets Gilbert's words, "He is an Englishman!" to a 
triumphant phrase, the music does not exemplify its label but shows the chorus's 
feeling that that one deserves moral credit for having succeeded in being born. 
British.) Combining all vocal music, including songs and operas and masses-and 
adding music used for dance and thus correlated with gestural labels-we would 
have a large body of referential music. If the rest of it remains nonreferential, it 
can still be said to belong to a symbol system. 
I doubt that Goodman would accept this sort of explanation of the exempli­
ficationality of musical works-or, more exactly, of musical performances, to 
which the metaphorical predicates apply, rather than to works, which .are (on 
Goodman's view) classes of musical performances. I am pretty sure it would by 
no means satisfy most of those who hold some form of semiotic view of music, 
for they would defend the referential character of music that has never been 
set to words or dance-motions. To concede that Beethoven's finale is, so to 
speak, triumph-music rather than music-referring-to-triumph would be to con­
cede, after all, a great part of what Hanslick (and perhaps, mutatis mutandis, 
Pbilodemus) were arguing for. But to go beyond this account would require 
appealing to some principle of extrapolation that would be hard to make plau­
sible. For example, we might say that once at least one musical passage has been 
provided with words, and in that way acquired a label, all musical passages to 
which that label truly applies, or belongs, also refer to it, since it has now, so to 
speak, been introduced into the "field of reference" and a semantic rule of 
correlation has been established. But then, even if we could hear that a musical 
passage is, say, funky, effervescent, or curdled, we could not know that the 
passage exemplifies the label until we had shown that a text containing that 
label ·had been set to some music that possesses the label. 
There is also the problem of our aesthetic commerce with nature: how does 
that fit into the semiotic scheme? The problem would disappear if we could 
show that q_ur interest in the beauty and expressiveness of natural objects is of a 
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radically different character from our interest in the beauty and expressiveness of 
artworks. But if this claim cannot be substantiated, we would havP. to explain 
how we manage to treat nature as if its contents belonged to a symbol system. 
If Goodman were to adopt the more restricted account I have suggested­
which attempts to say how some music becomes referential, though it entails 
that much expressive music is not-he would have to be a good deal more 
cautious about some things he says. In keeping with his aim, which is to propose 
a general framework for further investigation of all kinds of symbol systems, 
he is sparing of examples, but at one point he cites Charles Ives's Fourth 
Symphony as an example of a work containing "emphasis on . . .  the expressive" 
(p. 93)-so he evidently thinks there is reference there. 
But he does tend to take too much for granted in his uses of the term 
"exemplify." I cite four examples of what I have in mind. (1) "Emphasis on 
the denotive (representative or descriptive), the exemplificatory ('formal' or 
'decorative'), and the expressive in the arts varies with art, artist, and work" 
(p. 93). Doesn't this suggest that a work of art exemplifies all its formal features? 
A sonata-allegro movement can be used as an example, can serve as an example, 
of that structure, but surely (when not so used) it doesn't refer to its own 
structure. (2) "Pictures may exemplify colors . . .  "(p. 234). Perhaps the modal 
operator saves this remark from falsity, if we take it as elliptical for "are 
occasionally used to", but it does not save it from misleadingness. Surely a 
painting does not automatically refer to the colors it has. (3) "A performance 
of a musical work usually not only belongs to or complies with but also exem­
plifies the work or score" (p. 236). What is the warrant for saying this? The. 
performer foilows the score, but that doesn't make his performance refer 
to the score. Nor does the fact that his performance is a member of the class 
of performances that constitutes the work make his performance refer to that 
cla�unless all objects refer to all the classes they are members of. (4) "We saw 
that fictive representation and also · representation-as are matters of exem­
plification . . .  " (p. 254). But hold on! We saw no such thing. We did read 
in Chapter 2 that " 'Centaur' or a picture of a centaur exemplifies being a 
centaur-description or a centaur-picture, or more generally, being a centaur­
label" (p. 66). But nothing was said (and nothing had been said in Chapter 1) 
to support this really remarkable claim. Nor can I think what might be said. 
There is an air of prestidigitation here, as all these types of exemplification 
come out of the hat. The semiotic concept of art is shored up by too many 
gratuitous assumptions. In a passage that evinces Goodman's strong desire to get 
away from all accounts of the aesthetic that rely on immediacy, ineffability, 
passivity, mindless feeling, etc., he remarks: 
An experience· is exemplificational insofar as concerned with properties 
exemplified or expressed-Le., properties possessed and shown forth-by a 
symbol, not merely things the symbol denotes. Counting such exemplifica­
tionality as aesthetic may seem a concession to the tradition that associates 
the aesthetic with the immediate and nontransparent and so insists that the 
aesthetic object be taken for what it is in itself rather than as signifying 
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anything else. But exemplification, like denotation, relates a symbol to a 
referent, and the distance from a symbol to what applies to or is exempli­
fied by it is no less than the distance to what it applies to or denotes (p. 253). 
This is a proper emphasis. Unquestionably Goodman has given a powerful de­
fense of his semiotic concept of art, and a powerful impetus to further work 
along these important lines. But we cannot establish the pervasiveness of 
exemplificationality in the arts merely by applying this term freely to cases of 
predicate-possession. 
V. A. Howard, who has been active in Goodman's Harvard Project Zero, 
has defended the "Exemplification Theory" of music against what he calls 
"Soft Formalism", 
Which argues that statements like "This music expresses sadness" are reduc­
ible to metaphorical descriptions of the form "This music is sad" intended to 
elucidate literally ine.ffable structural features, fails to explain :metaphorical 
possession of expressed properties, and does not distinguish which among 
innumerable metaphorical properties of music are expressed: a piece might be 
described as an "old war horse" not for any of its musical features but be­
cause of its frequent performance.13 
The first of these two arguments is clearly a case of special pleading; since meta­
phorical possession is an element of metaphorical exemplification, the exempli­
ficationist is required just as much as the Soft Formalist to explain metaphorical 
possession-though Goodman seems to be suggesting at one point that no 
general explanation is called for: 
The question why predicates apply as they do metaphorically is much the 
same as the question why they apply as they do literally.  And if we have no 
good answer in either case, perhaps that is because there is no real question 
(p. 78). 
If there is a problem (and I am inclined to think there is) it is the same for both 
theories. The second argument also seems applicable to both. Granted that a 
musical work may be metaphorically an old war horse (or a testimony to the 
composer's creative genilus, or an insult to the ear-to add two other examples 
given by Howard),14 though it does not express any of these predicates. The 
Exemplificationist gets around the difficulty. according to Howard, by saying 
that 
A musical work expresses only those metaphorical properties possessed and 
referred to by the work as a symbol of a certain kind; that is, solely as 
music. 1 5  
If this marks the distinction satisfactorily, we need only substitute "an object" 
for "a symbol" to suit the Soft Formalist unless he prefers to avoid the term 
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"express" altogether. Given the logical relationships between the two theories, 
it seems plain that Soft Formalism cannot have any difficulties that Exempli· 
cationism doesn't have. 
IV 
If Goodman were to convince us that works of art are always, or typically, 
or at their best, characters (or classes of characters) in a symbol system, what· 
conclusions would we draw about the significance of art in human life and 
culture, about the appropriate ways of teaching people to understand the arts, 
about the relationship between study of the arts and other fields of human 
knowledge and inquiry? Aesthetic experience, according to Goodman,. 
involves making delicate discriminations and discerning sulbtle relationships, 
identifying symbol systems and what th'ese characters denote and exemplify, 
interpreting works and reorganizing the world in terms of works and works in 
terms of the world. (p. 241). 
Or, as the report on Harvard Project Zero says, 
many tasks in the arts, like many in science and daily life, involve the pro­
cessing (i.e., identification, application, interpretation, revision, invention) 
of symbols.16 
Learning to recognize that a picture is in three-point perspective, and to read 
one figure as roughly twice as far from the picture-plane as another, would be 
such a task . Recognizing Beethoven's finale and, say, the Wedding March in 
Mendelssohn's incidental music to ,Midsummer Night's Dream as both exem­
plifying triumph, but judging that lhe triumph exemplified in the former is 
more decisive and more profound than that exemplified in the latter would be 
another such tac;k. (This second task sounds more interesting if we take advan­
tage of Goodman's reluctant permission to describe it in terms of properties 
rather than labels.) 
All important human enterprises involve symbolic activity: whal distinguishes 
aesthetic symbolic activity (Goodman says) is that the symbol system operated 
with has at least some (not necessarily all) of the following four marks or indices: 
(1) synlaclic density (fo� any two characters, the scheme provides for a third 
character differing from each of them less than they differ from each other); (2) 
semantic density (for any two characters, the system provides for a referent that 
differs from each of their referents less than those referents differ from each 
other); (3) syntactic repleteness (every difference between one character and 
another makes a difference in what they denote); (4) exemplificationality. A 
literary work, considered as a printed text, is not syntactically dense, but it is 
exemplificatfonal, in heing expressive. A representational painting is dense both 
ways, expressive, and replete (it differs from a diagram, which is a representation 
in which only some of the features count in distinguishing one character from 
another). A musical work is a class of performances that comply with a score, 
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and the set of performances, taken as exemplifying various metaphorical labels, 
is both semantically and syntactically dense. 
Thus the features that mark aesthetic symbol systems "call for maximum 
sensitivity of discrimination" (p. 252), delicacy of judgment in distinguishing 
one character from another or one referent from another, the capacity to note 
subtle likenesses and differences, and (in the case of exemplification) skill in 
finding or constructing appropriate labels. It would seem to be these powers-in 
discerning, in sorting, in metaphorical labelling-which aesthetic education ought 
to develop, if Goodman's semiotic view of the arts is right. (He could not regard 
as adequate such a characterization of aesthetic education as "the development 
of sensitivity to the aesthetic qualities of things"1 7 -though this would have to 
be parl of the process.) How these, and perhaps other related, powers are to be 
developed must be determined in the light of relevant psychological knowledge­
such as Harvard Project Zero has been in the process of seeking. 
My question, however, concerns the special consequences for aesthetic edu­
cation that follow from the Exemplification Theory but not from the chief alter­
native, which I do not care to call "Soft Formalism" but which can be called the 
Exhibition Theory (or Possession Theory): i.e., that works of art have qualities 
describable by metaphorical predicates which they present for our apprehension 
but do not refer to. 
We might say, for example, that to apprehend music fully, on the Exem­
plification Theory, we must learn to make refined discriminations among aesthe­
tic qualities; but this is also true on the Exhibition Theory. We might say that 
on the Exemplification Theory we must learn to apply verbal labels, for it is, 
strictly speaking, labels that are referred to. There is perhaps a difference here, 
because the Exhibition Theory does not entail that we must label a quality 
very precisely in order to perceive it; yet our capacity to perceive subtle 
differences and hold them in mind might, even on this theory, depend on 
wielding a rich set of apt labels for descriptive purposes. We might say that 
lhe Exemplification Theory could encourage the study of music in a larger 
social and cultural context, since we would not be in a position to know what a 
given composition or performance exemplifies until we know the relevant rules 
. of reference; interpretation would require musicological knowledge. But some 
of this knowledge might also be required in order to know what qualities the 
work exhibits, unless we succumb to sheer impressionism. And if our Exem­
plification Theory allows us to infer a reference to any (musical) quality that 
is exhibited, then we need not seek for particular semantic rules. 
Other contrasling implications that suggest themselves, and have on occasion 
been advanced, do not seem to hold up better. The Exemplification Theory 
emphasizes the activity and involvement of the receiver-that is true and salutary. 
But the Exhibition Theory does not entail that the receiver is merely passive 
and unengaged. The Exemplification Theory recognizes an intelleclual as well 
as perceptual dimension in the musical experience. But the Exhibition Theory 
need not deny it: following the course of the music is itself a kind of thinking, a 
thinking in sounds. Besides, the thinking that would be involved in determining 
what is exemplified has to do, after all, with selecting the appropriate label, not 
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investigating rules of reference. In fact, it becomes quite difficult to say in what 
way the educational consequences of the two theories are different. This may 
suggest that something is wrong with the way they have been contrasted-or it 
may be taken as an argument that where the Exemplification Theory goes 
beyond the Exhibition Theory, it lacks a determinate content. 
v 
My conclusion so far turns out to be rather more negative than I once ex­
pected, and would have wished. I console myself with an echo of Aristotle's 
truly philosophic reflection, when he found he had to reject the ontology of 
.Plato: I can say that I count myself a friend of Beethoven (though I haven't put 
this on my calling.card, like Schindler), but magis amicus veritatis-assuming that 
truth is what I have got hold of. All is not lost. Underlying the urge to establish 
a semiotic theory of art, including the most'refractory art of music, is sometimes 
a fear that this is the only way to give substantial content to aesthetic education 
and thus secure for it a place in the study of the humanities. I believe this fear is 
unwarranted. Certainly there are many significant kinds of thinking connected 
with music: the thinking in sounds that is done by the composer, the analysis of 
the delicate and intricate structures of musical works, the classification of styles 
and their historical relationships-not to mention the application to musical 
phenomena of various sciences from anthropology to physics.18 Yet the 
question still remains whether music is not capable (along with other arts with 
capacities music does not posses.5) of playing a more direct and intimate cogni­
tive role in our experience-a role that would rank it among those things that are 
most worthy of attention in humanistic education. I want to suggest that it does 
have such a cognitive role-and one that Goodman's book has helped to point up 
and clarify-even if it does not have reference or belong to a symbol system. 
, 
I will try to share the unfinished thoughts I have in mind. But first a few 
words about the humanities. I am hesitant to ask a question like, "Does the 
study of music (i.e., aesthetic education in music) belong to the humanities?" 
because the more I think about the humanities, the less I feel I know what I am 
thinking about. It is often said, in a generic way that the humanities are those 
disciplines that are concerned with human works and ways, with the things made 
and things done by mankind. This is broad enough to cover a lot of ground, but 
even so it leaves out parts of philosophy, such as ontology-and in fact seems to 
suggest that the point of philosophy is not to philosophize but to study past 
philosophizing. The difficult problems arise when we try to give the differentia 
of the species, since obviously the human sciences (the social sciences, or 
studies, and psychology) are equally concerned with human actions and artifacts. 
What is distinctive of the humanistic concern with these matters? Many answers 
have been offered, of course.19 Among the distinctions invoked are: (1) that 
between values and facts (but history and much of philosophy are not 
necessarily concerned with values; and is social science value-free'?); (2) that 
between empirical knowledge and some higher kind of knowledge (but this epis­
temological dualism has its own serious difficulties); (3) that between an interest 
in empathy with the objects and events studied and an interest in explaining 
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them (but unless empathy leads to knowledge, this does not distinguish human­
istic study from attending the theater); (4) that between learning how to feel 
appropriately and learning how to think (but this dichotomy is hard to maintain 
coherently) . .  
So I don't have any definitive characterization of the humanities, but at best 
a brief for one of their features. There is, and t!here must always be, a vast body 
of empirical knowledge that is highly important, even indispensable, to human 
beings in their fundamental striving to get along with each other and with their 
natural environment, yet does not belong to any science. Some of it consists of 
singular propositions that are of interest and value to only a few people. Some of 
it consists in more or less well-confirmed general propositions that grow from 
reflection on ordinary experience (and extraordinary experiences). At any time 
any of these propositions may be taken over by the psychologist or sociologist, 
for example, subjected to methodical inquiry, refined and corrected and made 
ingredient in a system of scientific knowledge-or perhaps shown to be not true 
at all. Yet these working beliefs are a part of our equipment as persons and 
social beings, and their acquisition, mutual adjustment, trying out in the light of 
experience, is a central part of our education . It is these truths-in so far as they 
are true-that are the special concern of the humanities, I would say; though I 
do not say that they are the only truths of the humanities. 
Moreover, it is the serious attempt to deal with these propositions-not 
capable, or not yet capable, of rigorous demonstration or conclusive confirma­
tion, yet having to do (many of them) with some of the most momentous prob· 
lems that we face as human beings-that must lead, if anything can, to those 
qualities of mind that have traditionally been claimed as goals of humanistic 
education: tolerance of other views and lack of dogmatism about our own, 
sensitivity to a wide range of feelings in other persons, insight into alternative 
ways of thinking and of living, good judgment about what it is reasonable to 
believe even where calculation is not possible. 
If something like this can be said on behalf of the humanities, we should be 
able to say it also of aesthetic education-though we need not say exactly the 
same things about all the arts. Certainly literary works embody and make es· 
sential use of generalizations about human actions as well as psychological 
mechanisms that can be used to explain human actions.20 Representational 
paintings, especially those that recall a story or record a scene, evidently also 
have a cognitive content of some kind, even if it is not easy to analyze. But I 
have chosen to make music the center of my discussion just because it seems to 
be the least susceptible to defense along these lines, yet most in need of it. How, 
then, can music be considered from this point of view? 
The first thing we must bear in mind, I think, is that composers and perform­
ers together have greatly increased the variety of structures and qualities in the 
world. Here is one of the significant ways in which man has added, and on the 
whole commendably, to nature-though we ought also to remember the wise 
reply of Polixenes in The Win ter's Tale, when Perdita says she cares not for the 
"streak'd gillyvors, /Which some call nature's bastards": 
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Perdita. For I have heard it said 
There is an art which in their picdness shares 
With great creating nature. 
Polixenes. Say there be; 
Yet nature is made better by no mean 
But nature makes that mean: so, over that art, 
Which you say adds to nature, is an art 
That nature makes . . . .  
The Art itself is nature. 
I am not arguing that music-tnakers have thus done their part to bring us to the 
best of all possible worlds, which, according to Leibniz, combil)es the greatest 
variety with the greatest order. But they have contributed to the potential 
freedom of humankind, in one of its important dimensions: I mean the range 
of choiceworthy things the world affords. But I say "potential" because it re­
quires other conditions, political and economic, for any human being to be in a 
position to make his choices, and for freedom to be actual. 
Besides this ontological consideration we can set the epistemological one. 
Recall the remark of Nelson Goodman's, quoted above, about "reorganizing the 
world in terms of works and works in terms of the world." Much earlier in his 
book, where he is discussing representation in paintings, he expands this idea: 
Representation or description is apt, effective, illuminating, subtle, intriguing, 
to the extent that the artist or writer grasps fresh and signific.ant relationships 
and devises means for making them manifest . . . . If his picture is recognized 
as almost but not quite reforri�g to the commonplace furniture of the every­
day world, or if it calls for and yet resists assignment to a usual kind of pic­
ture, it may bring out neglected likenesses and differences:, force unaccus­
tomed associations, and in some measure remake our world. And if the point 
of the picture is not only successfully made but is also well-taken, if the re­
alignments it directly and indirectly effects are interesting and important, 
the picture-like a crucial experiment-makes a genuine contribution to 
knowledge (pp. 32-33) .. 
What strikes me is that, although this claim is couched in terms that presuppose 
the referential character of some pictures, something very like it can be said in 
terms that do not presuppose reference at all. 
As the Imitation Theory of art has insisted from the beginning, many of the 
properties (the structures and qualities) we find in music belong to families of 
properties found in other things. On Goodman's account, a metaphorical predi­
cate always brings with it a "schema," or set of coordinate predicates, when 
transferred from its "home realm" to another. The "semantic differentiaI" 
investigators have shown how pairs of terms (i.e., schemata) like "hot/coldi" 
"hard/soft" (to which Ernst Gombrich has added "ping/pong") can effect 
classifications in an amazing variety of alien realms. When we transfer, say, 
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"triumph/defeat" or "triumph/struggle/resignation" from life-contexts to pas­
sages of music, we not only effect a new classification within music but may also 
sharpen our use of these terms in their home realm. Moreover, we effect another 
classification that cuts across the transfer, putting naval triumphs, moral 
triumphs, musical triumphs together into a new class, or family. The meta­
phorical predication registers, and helps us to make, a discovery that some 
property is possessed by both the moral triumph and the musical triumph. 
This is empirical knowledge, and it does not depend on the as.5umption that 
music is referential. 
And to see these possibilities of sorting the things of our world, in ways 
that cut across the categories established for practical and scientific purposes, is 
no inconsiderable kind of cognition. Especially in an age like ours, where we 
are overwhelmed by our success in manipulating the physical environment to 
suit our own purposes-at least to suit the short-range purposes of sorne of us, 
who have the power to determine which rivers shall be reduced to sewers, which 
forests ravaged, which hills and fields stripped of all potentiality of life. To be 
able, even sometimes perhaps in play, to place the things outside us (that is, 
natural objects and such created entities as visual designs and musical designs) in 
the same classes as our own thoughts and feelings may help to wean us from 
that ruthlessness toward nature (the art over the art) that is one of the curses 
of Weste�n Civilization. We have achieved a deep alienation of our humanity 
from our natural environment; perhaps natural piety can be restored through rthe 
mediation of art, if artworki; can show us, can teach and frequently remind us, 
that many o f  those qualities that are so important to us in human life can also 
be exhibited in physical objects and processes. Such reflections need not en­
gender superstitious terror or enervating sentimentality, but they may enable us 
to feel for the whole of which we are ourselves a part a kind of affection and 
respect. 
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